This paper applies a threshold autoregression (TAR) model to a casualties time series to show that the autoregressive nature of such events depends on the level of terrorism at the time of a shock. Following a shock, persistence of heightened attacks characterizes low-terrorism regimes, but not high-terrorism regimes. Similar findings are associated with incidents with deaths, bombings with deaths, and hostage taking. In contrast, the assassinations series indicates some persistence even in the high-terrorism state, while the threats/hoaxes series displays persistence in only the high-terrorism state. For all series studied, the TAR model outperforms a standard autoregressive representation. A forecasting method is engineered based on the TAR estimates, and nicely tracks resource-using events.
Introduction
The death, destruction, and economic impacts resulting from the four hijackings on September 11, 2001 (henceforth, 9/11) made policymakers and the public acutely aware of the threat posed by transnational terrorism to liberal democracies worldwide. 1 The sheer magnitude of 9/11 led to repercussions that have touched most countries through economic spillovers, collateral damage, or security expenditures. As the public learned about the global reach of the al-Qaida network, the true threat of transnational terrorism became better understood. To assist in this understanding, social scientists must apply theoretical and empirical tools to analyze the actions of terrorists and identify the most appropriate response of governments. In particular, economic methods and models can enlighten policymakers on transnational terrorism (Sandler and Enders 2004) . Consumer-choice models can be tailored to display terrorists' choices when constrained by their resources and the policies of the authorities (Landes 1978; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983) . Empirically, time-series techniques can derive policy implications and forecasts (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 1994; Sandler 1993, 1995) .
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal violence or brutality by subnational groups or individuals to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience. Terrorist acts are purposely brutal to create an atmosphere of fear, while publicizing the terrorists' cause. As the public becomes numb to their acts of violence, terrorists ratchet up the carnage to maintain media interest. An essential ingredient in defining terrorism is the presence of a political objective, which can involve getting a country out of an international organization, the formation of an Islamic state, the United States ending its support of Israel, or other goals.
A crucial factor of modern-day terrorism is the transnational implications of many terrorist attacks. When a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, perpetrators, or audiences in two or more countries, terrorism takes on a transnational character. A terrorist act may be transnational owing to its impact, its planning and execution, its perpetrators (if known), or its targets and resulting damage. A skyjacking of a plane with passengers from multiple countries is a transnational terrorist event, as is a skyjacking of a domestic flight originating in one country but terminating in another country. The skyjackings on 9/11 were transnational terrorist acts, as were the near-simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August 1998. We focus on transnational terrorism because of its importance in the post-9/11 world and data availability.
Although transnational terrorist attacks are down in the post-Cold War period, the lethality of these attacks has increased with each incident almost 17 percentage points more likely to result in death or injuries (Enders and Sandler 2000) . The casualties time series, involving one or more deaths or injuries, displays predictable factors unlike the noncasualties series, which is largely random following detrending. In a subsequent study, Enders and Sandler (2002) use a threshold autoregression (TAR) model applied to just the death series to identify nonlinearities following shocks. When terrorism is in a low-intensity regime with attacks below a data-determined threshold, shocks that raise the level of events are sustainable. In contrast, shocks during a high-intensity regime of terrorism (i.e., attacks above a data-determined threshold) are episodic with series returning rapidly to the mean number of events.
The primary purpose of the current study is to apply TAR analysis to additional transnational terrorist time series including important subcomponents of the overall all-incident series. In particular, we analyze both the death and casualties time series for nonlinearities as well as the component series of bombings with one or more deaths. Additionally, we apply a TAR model to series involving assassinations, hostage taking, and threats and hoaxes. A wide variety of nonlinearities are uncovered for component series -e.g., shocks to the assassinations series display some persistence in both the low-and high-intensity regime; shocks to the threats and hoaxes series result in persistence in only the high-intensity regime. An important finding is that the response to an external shock depends on current activity levels, which may vary among different kinds of terrorist events so policy prescriptions must be tailored to the kind of event. A secondary purpose is to engineer a forecasting technique based on the TAR representation of the component time series.
Terrorists' Choice-Theoretic Model
We view terrorists as rational actors who maximize their well-being by allocating their resources among alternative goals while accounting for underlying constraints. Rationality is judged by the terrorists' predictable response to changes in their constraints and not by their particular goals or the means used to achieve them. Terrorist reactions to shocks in high-and low-terrorism states are dependent on available resources. For instance, the ability to shift sufficient resources between activities and intertemporally to sustain higher levels in a lowintensity period is typically greater than in an already high-intensity regime.
At the group level, terrorists must allocate resources at three different layers: (i) between terrorist (T) and nonterrorist (N) activities, (ii) among alternative terrorist modes of attack, and (iii) among different time periods. For conceptual simplicity, we assume that each of these decisions is independent. When deciding between terrorist and nonterrorist activities (e.g., propaganda, seeking election), the terrorist group -treated as a unitary entity -must determine N and T so as to maximize expected utility [E(U)]:
where U (W) is the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, π is the probability of success, and 1 -π is the probability of failure. Moreover, W S and W F are the net wealth equivalent measures over the two states -success (S) and failures (F). These measures can be expressed as:
( ) ( , ) .
In Equations 2 and 3, w denotes the group's current assets, net of current earnings or losses.
Terrorists receive w and the net gain, g N , from nonterrorist incidents regardless of the outcome of the terrorist activities. These latter gains increase as the extent of nonterrorist activities, as , and environmental factors, e, which involve actions by the authorities to limit the gains from terrorism (e.g., freezing assets, hardening targets, and intelligence).
In Equation 3, the net wealth for a terrorist failure includes the group's current assets plus its gains from legitimate activities minus the monetary equivalence of the fine or penalty, f, from failure. When failure is associated with no arrests, f represents the lost resources. In more dire circumstances where terrorists are apprehended, the penalty refers not only to wasted resources (including fallen comrades), but also the opportunity cost of imprisonment and any monetary penalties. Fines are likely positively related to the level of terrorist activity, R
indicates an environmental factor that influences the level of losses during failed campaigns.
A secondary choice involves the allocation of R T among alternative modes of attacks.
Suppose that a group only uses two kinds of operations -hostage taking (h) and bombings (b).
Further suppose that the per-unit costs of each kind of operation is ( , ) and ( , ) 
where tomorrow's terrorism equals tomorrow's resource endowment plus (minus) the earnings on savings (the payments on borrowings) from the initial period. Terrorists maximize an intertemporal utility function, 0 1 ( , ), U T T subject to Equation 6 and, in so doing, decide terrorist activities over time. Thus, terrorists can react to shocks by augmenting operations not only from curbing nonterrorist activities, but also through an intertemporal substitution of resources. If high-terrorism regimes are supported by an intertemporal substitution, then shocks during such a regime can typically elevate resource-using terrorist activities for only a short time, unlike lowterrorism regimes where terrorists can draw on accumulated resources. This prediction may not characterize non-resource-using threats and hoaxes.
Thus far, we analyze the choice-theoretic decision of a single terrorist group. When groups are linked in a network, the same model applies to the network by attributing the utility and resource constraints to be those of the network. If terrorists are tied together implicitly through similar hatreds and grievances, then multiple terrorist groups may act as a unified whole and respond identically to shocks, so that our choice-theoretic representation would also characterize this conglomerate of groups. By copying one another's innovations, terrorists worldwide take on the appearance of a single group, thereby giving rise to distinct peaks and troughs in transnational terrorist events (Enders and Sandler 1999; Faria 2003) .
Data and Terrorist Time Series
Data on transnational terrorist incidents are drawn from International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), which records the incident date, type of event, casualties (i.e., deaths or injuries), if any, and other variables. By splicing together the earlier ITERATE data sets, ITERATE 5's "common" file contains 40 or so key variables common to all terrorist events from 1968 to 2000 (Mickolus et al. 2002) . Thus, earlier ITERATE data for various subperiods no longer need to be consulted. Coding consistency for ITERATE and its updates has been maintained by applying the same criteria for defining transnational terrorist events and associated variables.
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ITERATE draws its information from the world newsprint and electronic sources.
In total, we extract six quarterly time series from ITERATE for the purposes of the paper.
The most inconclusive of these series is the casualties series, in which one or more persons were injured or killed in a transnational terrorist incident. The death series is a subset of the casualties series and includes only incidents where one or more persons -terrorist or victim -died. We focus on these time series, because earlier work indicates that they are more predictable than the inclusive series of all incidents (Enders and Sandler 2000) . We use quarterly, rather than monthly, data to avoid periods with zero observations. Because bombing is the favorite tactic of terrorists, accounting for almost half of all events, a time series involving bombings with one or more deaths (henceforth called the bomb series) is also extracted. Bomb combines seven types of events -explosive bombings, letter bombings, incendiary bombings, missile attacks, car bombings, suicide car bombings, and mortar and grenade attacks -involving at least one death.
The remaining three series are components of the all-incidents series. The assassinations series consists of politically based murders or attempted murders. Although most assassinations end in one or more deaths, some are unsuccessful so that the assassinations series is not a subset of the death or casualties series. The hostage series includes kidnappings, transnational skyjackings, nonaerial hijackings, and barricade and hostage-taking events drawn from ITERATE. These events need not end with a casualty. Finally, the threats/hoaxes series combines two component events: threats or promises of future actions and hoaxes or falsely claimed past actions. By their nature, threats and hoaxes involve no casualties and uses little or no resources.
Estimates of Casualties and Deaths
There are several reasons to believe that the dynamic patterns of transnational terrorists display nonlinear behavior. In relatively tranquil times, terrorists can replenish and stockpile resources, recruit new members, raise funds, and plan for future attacks. Terrorism can remain low until an event occurs that switches the system into a high-terrorism regime. Because each terrorist attack utilizes scarce resources, increased terrorist activities in response to shocks during high-terrorism states are not anticipated to exhibit a high degree of persistence as resource stocks become depleted quickly. Since periods with little terrorism involve few resource costs, an elevated campaign in response to shocks during a low-terrorism regime can be highly persistent as terrorists use stockpiled resources or normal resource inflows from activities (e.g., extortion) or contributions.
Moreover, Faria (2003) shows that the attack and counterattack strategies played by the authorities and terrorists can lead to cyclical patterns. As in a game of cat-and-mouse, highterrorism regimes induce political leaders to undertake counter-terrorism policies. Once the overall amount of terrorism declines, the political will to sustain a vigilant counter-terrorism policy dissipates and a new cycle begins. Sandler (1995, 2000) use spectral analysis to show that the most logistically complex terrorist events have the longest cycles; however, the length of a cycle need not be deterministic. As such, an alternative estimation strategy is needed to account for the possibility of high-versus low-terrorism states.
A realistic way to capture the nature of terrorist campaigns is to use a regime-switching model, which allows for several states of the world (or regimes) such that the severity of terrorism differs across states. To formally model this type of behavior, we utilize the tworegime version of the TAR model developed by Tong (1983 Tong ( , 1990 ):
1 if 0 if ,
where y t is the series of interest, α i and β i are coefficients to be estimated, τ is the value of the threshold, p is the order of the model, d is the delay parameter, and I t is the Heaviside indicator function.
7
The nature of the TAR model is that there are two states of the world. In the highterrorism state, y t-d exceeds the value of the threshold τ, so that I t = 1 and y t follows the autoregressive process, α 0 + Σα i y t-i . Similarly, in the low-terrorism state, y t-d < τ, so that I t = 0, and y t follows the autoregressive process, β 0 + Σβ i y t-i . There are two attractors or potential "equilibrium" values: in the high-terrorism state, the system is drawn toward α 0 /(1 -Σα i ), and, in the low-terrorism state, the system is drawn toward β 0 /(1 -Σβ i ). Note that the TAR model is equivalent to an AR(p) model when all α i = β i .
To avoid the problem of overfitting, we use the same type of nonlinear model for each of the various terrorist series. It seems natural to apply a TAR model in the form of Equation 7 and 8 to compare the persistence of high-versus low-terrorism regimes. First, a TAR model permits us to estimate the value of the threshold without imposing an a priori line of demarcation between the regimes. Second, the key feature of the TAR model is that a sufficiently large ε t shock can cause the system to switch between regimes. The dates at which the series crosses the threshold are not specified beforehand by the researcher; instead, the data determine whether the series is in the high-or low-terrorism state. Third, because the variance of ε t is regime independent, the different degrees of persistence can be compared using characteristic roots.
When the characteristic root for a regime is zero, there is an immediate jump to the attractor for that regime. If, however, a regime has a unit characteristic root, the number of incidents will meander indefinitely until a shock occurs that causes a regime change. In intermediate cases, the speed of adjustment within a regime is inversely related to the largest root for that regime. Chan (1993) shows that a grid search over all potential values of the thresholds yields a super-consistent estimate of the unknown threshold parameter τ. To use the method, order the observations from smallest to largest such that:
Each value of y j is then allowed to serve as an estimate of the threshold τ. For each of these values, the Heaviside indicator is set using Equation 8 and an equation in the form of Equation 7 is then estimated. The regression equation with the smallest residual sum of squares contains the consistent estimate of the threshold. We follow the conventional practice of excluding the highest and lowest 15% of the {y j } values to ensure an adequate number of observations on each side of the threshold. Similarly, the delay factor, d, is selected as the arranged autoregression providing the best fit. As discussed in Hansen (1997) , since τ is estimated consistently, the estimates of α i and β i converge to a t-distribution as sample size increases.
Incidents with Casualties
We begin by estimating the number of incidents with casualties (cas) as the linear AR(3) autoregressive process: with an attractor of 21.9. The largest characteristic root is 0.91, indicating very persistent behavior following a shock with little tendency to return to the attractor.
The different speeds of adjustment imply that the short-run forecasts from the two models will differ. As analyzed in Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) . Because the residuals may not have a normal distribution, the residuals are selected using standard "bootstrapping"
procedures. In particular, the residuals are drawn with replacement using a uniform distribution.
Call these residuals 
The essential point is that the sample averages of The entire set of conditional forecasts is shown by the solid line in the top panel of Figure   1 . Although the expected number of cas incidents does decline toward 31.1, there are two reasons why the long-term forecast continues to decline. Since incidents below the threshold are (on average) more persistent than those above, the system's mean will be below the attractor.
Moreover, the forecasts allow for the possibility of a regime-switch into the low-terrorism state.
As shown in Panel a, the long-run forecast is about 28.5 cas incidents per quarter. It is interesting to note that this long-run forecast is greater than the sample mean of 25.4. When the number of cas incidents is high, there is a rapid decline to the threshold, as terrorist networks cannot maintain high-level, resource-using offensives. A comparison of the forecasts with the actual number of casualty incidents (the dashed line in the figure) is instructive. The close fit is remarkable given that the forecasts are not 1 step-ahead forecasts, and, instead, traces out the 1-step through 25-step ahead forecasts.
In contrast, the number of terrorist incidents in the last three quarters of 1998 were quite low; y 1998:2 = 5, y 1998:3 = 15, and y 1998:4 = 6. As shown in Panel b of Figure 1 , reversion back toward the attractor of 21.9 is quite slow in the low-terrorism state. In fact, conditional on the history of 1998:4, the forecasts remain below 21.9 until the third quarter of 2001. The forecasts seem to track the actual number of incidents occurring through the end of our data set reasonably well and ultimately converge to those for Panel a.
Incidents with Deaths
Incidents with deaths are a major component of the cas series comprising 62% of such incidents. The death series is more complete than the series in Enders and Sandler (2002) , because it runs from 1968:1 through 2000:4. The sample mean is 15.7 incidents per quarter. We first estimate the death series as the linear AR(2) autoregressive process: death t = 4.54 + 0.406death t-1 + 0.314death t-2 + ε t ; AIC = 1100.47. Because a typical death incident is more difficult to execute than one with casualties (each incident of the death series is necessarily included in the cas series), the reduced persistence for death in the high-terrorism state is reasonable.
In the low-terrorism state, Equation 14 becomes y t = 1.86 + 0.582y t-1 + 0.379y t-2 , with a large characteristic root of 0.97, consistent with near random-walk behavior. When the number of incidents is below the threshold value of 22, there is little tendency to return to a long-run mean value. In the low-terrorism state, the death series shows even less tendency to return to the mean than the cas series. This finding poses a real concern during the pre-and post-9/11 era of low terrorism, because the enhanced lethality of terrorist events of the post-Cold War era, found by Enders and Sandler (2000) , is anticipated to persist. Figure 2 where the number of such incidents for 1999:1 is expected to be about 10. Thus, from the perspective of 1998:4, the forecasted number of death incidents is anticipated to gradually rise until the long-run forecast of 17.6 is reached.
TAR Estimates of Other Series
In this section, we estimate how the key subcomponents of the cas and death series behave over time. Moreover, other incident types may be politically and/or economically important even when they do not always entail deaths or casualties. A credible threat may entail costly prevention. Although an assassination may fail, the attempt may provoke the same political intimidation and utilize as many resources as a successful one.
A problem is that some of these series are somewhat thin. For example, the number of bombings with deaths has a mean of 7.1 incidents per quarter and there are two zero values near the beginning of the sample period. Because we use count data and the number of incidents cannot be negative, the assumption of normality is violated. One alternative is to perform the estimation assuming that the series is generated from a Poisson or negative binomial distribution, which forces the number of incidents to be non-negative. Experimentation with these specifications yield results that are in accord with those stated in Cameron and Trivedi (1998, p. 89): "Nevertheless, OLS estimates in practice give results quantitatively similar to those for the Poisson and other estimators using the exponential mean." Since the models estimated using the Poisson are more difficult to interpret, we report the results for the AR and TAR models assuming normality.
Bombings with Deaths
In order to determine how an important subcomponent of the death series behaves, we examine the number of bombings with deaths (the bomb series). The linear model is: After we pared down the insignificant coefficients, we obtain the following TAR model:
(12.62) (2.27) (2.79) (3.38) AIC = 1009.80, τ = 11, and d = 1.
As measured by the AIC, the TAR specification has a better fit than the linear model. In the high-terrorism state (bomb t-1 ≥ 11), the quarterly number of incidents returns immediately to 9.60 after a shock; in the low-terrorism state, the quarterly number of incidents returns very gradually to the attractor after a shock. Given that the bomb series comprises 45% of the death series, the similarity of the TAR estimates is reasonable with the threshold of 11 for bomb being half that of death. Analogously, the high-terrorism intercept of the bomb series is just over 45%
of that of the death series. In the low-terrorism state, the largest characteristic root for bomb is 0.83. As such, there tends to be more persistence in the low-terrorism state for deaths than for bomb following shocks.
Assassinations
Like the bomb series, the assassination series (as) suggests a slow rate of convergence to the long-run mean.
The TAR model with the best fit is:
(5.68) (3.92) (0.622) (3.18) (3.10) AIC = 1003.79, τ = 9, and d = 2.
The attractor in the high-terrorism state (as t-2 ≥ 9) is approximately 11.5 incidents per quarter.
Insofar as the sole characteristic root for the high-terrorism state is 0.372, there is relatively rapid convergence to the attractor. The assassination persistence, though small, in the high-terrorism state may stem from two sources: (i) modest resource requirements and (ii) scale economies in planning. The latter means that shocks during an active regime may trigger a wave of murders before the series converges. In the low-terrorism state following 9/11, there is a near unit-root implying almost no decay.
In the last three quarters of 1985, assassinations numbered 15, 18, and 20, respectively. 
Hostage Taking Incidents
Hostage taking incidents (hos t ) are well-estimated by the linear AR (2) When we purge the hos t-1 term from Equation 20, the AIC increases and there appears to be a significant autocorrelation coefficient at lag 1. As measured by the AIC, the TAR(1) model fits the data better than the linear specification. In the high-terrorism state (hos t-1 ≥ 15) , the skeleton predicts an immediate jump back to 15.59 incidents per quarter following a shock, so that elevated activity in the high-terrorism regime is unsustainable for more than a single quarter. In the low-terrorism state (hos t-1 < 15), the approach to the attractor is gradual; the largest characteristic root in the low-terrorism state is 0.72. Following the shock, the number of hostagetaking incidents can remain below the attractor for comparatively long periods of time. The hostage series behaves similarly in terms of its TAR representation to the death series, even though many hostage incidents do not result in a death. Over the sample period, the correlation coefficient between the hostage and death series is 0.536.
Threats and Hoaxes
A particularly interesting result is that the non-resource-using threats/hoaxes series (th t ) has precisely the opposite pattern of persistence than the other series. In the low-terrorism state (i.e., th t-2 < 12), the point estimate of the skeleton indicates that the quarterly number of incidents will immediately jump to 7.86 following a shock. In contrast, the attractor for the high-terrorism regime is 19.2 incidents per quarter. Moreover, the speed of adjustment for the high-terrorism regime is very low, since the largest characteristic root is 0.93.
This flip-flop in regime behavior for threats/hoaxes, compared with the other series studied, is surely due to the non-resource-using nature of these events. Shocks during high-terrorism regimes may be sustainable if heightened threats reinforce one another (i.e., they are complementary) to create the desired state of anxiety for society. As such, there may be little diminishing returns to further threats and hoaxes.
The history for 1998:4 is such that th 1998:1 = 4, th 1998:2 = 2, th 1999:1 = 14, and th 1999:2 = 6.
Insofar as th 1998:4 is less than the threshold value, there is a predicted jump to approximately 7.86 incidents per quarter. There are several plausible explanations why the threats/hoaxes series has drifted towards zero in recent years. The increase in religious fundamentalism has resulted in a greater willingness of terrorists to engage in behavior resulting in casualties and deaths (Enders and Sandler 2000; Hoffman 1998 ). The fact that the media now focuses only on the most severe events may have decreased the benefits terrorists derive from a threat or a hoax. Regardless of the best explanation, the world is clearly in a persistent regime in which threats and hoaxes are low.
The striking differences in the measures of persistence for each of the six series are summarized in Table 1 . The sample means, thresholds and delay parameters are reported in columns 2 through 4 and the estimated attractors for the high and low terrorism regimes are shown in columns 5 and 6. Respectively, columns 7 through 9 report the largest characteristic root for the linear model, the low-terrorism regime, and the high-terrorism regime.
Concluding Remarks
For all six time series examined, a TAR model that allows for different autoregressive behavior during high-and low-terrorism regimes fits the data better than some linear AR model, which gives an average representation. For forecasting purposes, the TAR model leads to reasonably good forecasts for the casualties, death, and assassinations series. Because these forecasts vary significantly in terms of the persistence of incidents to shocks depending on the underlying terrorism regime, forecasts for such events should rely on the appropriate TAR representation. In the case of threats/hoaxes, the forecasts (not displayed), based on the TAR model, did not fit the actual series owing to a high degree of volatility that defies prediction.
Forecasts appear to improve with the level of resources required of the underlying event. The development of these forecasting procedures can better allow the authorities to gauge terrorist reactions to shocks stemming from policies to crack down on terrorism or political events (e.g., a
Middle East peace agreement).
The breakdown of the all-incident series into component series indicates a number of insights. First, the rate of convergence following shocks differs greatly between the aggregate series and its components, so that the behavior of an aggregate series is unlikely to characterize its component series. Second, the level of persistence following shocks tends to differ among component series themselves, so that generalizations must be resisted. Third, component series need not be in the same regime simultaneously -i.e., assassinations may be in a high-level regime, while hostage taking is in a low-level regime. These can differ owing to substitutions induced by anti-terrorism policies: i.e., policy aimed at making one type of attack mode harder makes another attack mode relatively easier (cheaper).
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent "war on terror" came during a time when the number of incidents involving casualties was in a low-terrorism regime. Nevertheless, each terrorist event had a greater number of casualties on average than in past decades. Our analysis indicates that shocks following 9/11 would be met with heightened terrorist campaigns that can be sustained for some time. The low-terrorism regime era of religious terrorism means that shocks will be met with some persistence of heightened campaigns. Thus, the terrorist alert level which has been elevated since being instituted by the Bush administration is unlikely to fall in the near future owing to terrorists' abilities to sustain campaigns during low-terrorism regimes.
Footnotes
1. The special threats and dilemmas of liberal democracies when confronting modernday terrorism are addressed in Hoffman (1998) and Wilkinson (1986) .
2. Support of the rational-actor representation of terrorists is provided by Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983) and Landes (1978) . Also, see cites within these articles.
3. The choice-theoretic model derives from Landes (1978) and Sandler, Tschirhart, and Caluley (1983) . The introduction of an intertermporal choice in Equations 6 and 7 is novel for the terrorism literature and allows for high-and low-terrorism regimes.
4. 5. If the resource constraint is more convex-to-the-origin than the indifference curve, then a corner solution is anticipated.
6. For a fuller description of how ITERATE delineates transnational terrorist incidents, see the discussion in Mickolus, Sandler, and Murdock (1989) . 7. It would be possible to estimate a multi-regime model; however, as the number of regimes increases, the number of observations in each regime decreases. Given our concern about thin series, we choose a two-regime model.
8. In the literature, there are several different ways to report the AIC; here we use: AIC = T*ln(ssr) + 2n where T = number of usable observations, ssr = sum of squared residuals and n = number of parameters estimated (including the threshold). Note that the AIC is not a cardinal measure of fit and any monotonic transformation of this measure of AIC will select the same model.
9. Let ρ i denote the i-th residual autocorrelation coefficient. Although the Q-statistics allow us to reject the null hypothesis of serially correlated residuals, we are somewhat concerned that ρ 7 = 0.21. As such, we also estimate models using longer lag lengths. Estimating a model using y t-7 does not yield any substantial changes to the results reported below. 11. Although the Q-statistics allow us to reject the null hypothesis of serially correlated residuals, we are somewhat concerned that ρ 7 = 0.21. As such, we also estimate models using longer lag lengths with no substantial influence on the results reported in the text.
12. Given that we estimate each series as a univariate process, the cas series can be in the high (low) state, while the death series is in the (low) high state. To our knowledge there is no well-developed procedure to estimate TAR models in a multi-equation system. 
